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Abstract: The Soviet Union and 
the Communist International had 
an adverse influence on the Latin 
American workers’ movement, 
continually diverting it fighting for 
a democratic socialist society. They 
subordinated the workers’ movements 
to the interests of the Soviet 
Union’s ruling class, the Communist 
bureaucracy. At one moment, they led 
the workers’ movement in disastrous 
uprisings, while in a subsequent era 
they encouraged it to build alliances 
with capitalist and imperialist power.
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Resumo: A União Soviética e a 
Internacional Comunista tiveram uma 
influência adversa no movimento 
latino-americano de trabalhadores, 
frequentemente, distraindo-o de sua 
luta por uma sociedade socialista 
democrática. Ambas subordinaram 
os movimentos de trabalhadores aos 
interesses da classe dominante na União 
Soviética, a burocracia comunista. Em 
um momento, dirigiram o movimento de 
trabalhadores para levantes desastrosos, 
enquanto em um período subsequente 
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1 INTRODuCTION
The Soviet Union and the Communist International worked 
to influence Latin America from 1918 until the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc in 1991. How do we evaluate 
the impact of the Soviet Union and the Communist International 
on the workers’ movement in Latin America? One can judge the 
Communist parties by the size of their organizations, or by their 
influence in the labor unions, or by the numbers of people they 
elected to parliaments, or the number who received ministe-
rial portfolios in government. One can look too at the impact of 
Communist ideas on the society more broadly and perhaps even of 
what can be called Communist culture.1 Certainly all of those are 
significant gauges. The better  measure of the Communists would 
be, however, what they generally claimed was their own criterion: 
that is, their success or failure in furthering the goal of building 
a movement from below to bring working people to power and 
to create socialist society. This is the criterion used in this article 
to look at the role of the Communist International and the Soviet 
Union in Latin America from 1918 until the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the Eastern Bloc in 1991.
The contention here is that the Communist International and 
Soviet Union had, throughout nearly their entire history, an adverse 
influence on the workers’ movement, continually diverting it from 
the goal of fighting for a democratic socialist society. The rulers of 
the Soviet Union directed the Communist parties around the world, 
including in Latin America, through the Communist International 
(Comintern) (1919-1943) — later the Communist Information 
Bureau (Cominform) (1947-1956) — and after that through the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet embassies. 
They subordinated the workers’ movements to the interests of the 
Soviet Union; or, to be exact, to the interests of the Soviet ruling 
class, the Communist bureaucracy.2
1  Communism with a capital C refers to the Communist model whose principle 
examples in the twentieth century were the Soviet Union, China and Cuba.
2 The Soviet Union, China, Vietnam, North Korea, and Cuba were, in the twentieth 
century, societies that would be best described as bureaucratic collectivist, ruled 
by a Communist bureaucracy that owned the state and through it the means of 
production.
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In making such an evaluation, it is not simply a question of 
drawing up a balance sheet of assets and liabilities, but of under-
standing the overall impact of Communism on the workers’ move-
ments. The Communist International and the Soviet Union at one 
moment led the Latin American workers’ movement to engage in 
ill-conceived and disastrous uprisings, while in a subsequent era 
they encouraged the workers’ movement to build alliances with 
capitalist and imperialist powers. By the late 1920s, the Soviet 
Communist model of the authoritarian party, the one-party state, 
and the quasi-religious Marxist-Leninist ideology had replaced 
the Marxist socialist notion of a democratically organized labor 
movement and socialist parties fighting for the historic the goal of 
establishing a democratic socialist state. Those two issues—subor-
dination to Soviet interests and the distortion of socialist values—
meant that the Latin American Communist parties had a negative 
and destructive impact on the workers movement.
2 THE HISTORIOGRAPHY
Throughout the Cold War era, historiography on Latin American 
Communism was dominated by the notion of a struggle between 
Soviet totalitarianism and Western Democracy (JACOBSON, 1994). 
Western, mostly U.S. historians argued that the Soviet Union and 
the Communist International wished to lead a worldwide revo-
lution that would destroy democracy and impose everywhere a 
totalitarian political and social system such as existed in the Soviet 
Union. As expressed by Hannah Arendt, whose book The Origins 
of Totalitarianism (1951) became a touchstone text for Cold War 
thinking, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union both created societ-
ies which were the polar opposite of bourgeois democracy with 
its “lawful government” and “positive laws” (ARENDT, 1976).3 She 
asserted the superiority of bourgeois democracy over totalitari-
anism. In bourgeois democratic societies one has freedom of the 
press, of assembly, and of petition, all of which make it possible 
3 See especially her final chapter, “Ideology and Terror: A Novel form of 
Government” (ARENDT, 1976, p. 460 – 479).
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not only to organize and protest, but also to change the govern-
ment, if not the nature of the regime. Taken alone, however, her 
book Totalitarianism presented a distorted view of reality because 
she offered no similar critique of capitalism and its quite limited 
democracy or of the lack of democracy in its neo-colonial empires.
Yet, totalitarianism, defined differently, might have provided 
a useful framework. It is often forgotten that the term “totalita-
rian” as applied to the Communist Party and the Soviet Union was 
first used by the Left, by anarchists, socialists, and Trotskyists. 
Leon Trotsky wrote in The Revolution Betrayed in 1936 that, “The 
[Communist Soviet] regime had become ‘totalitarian’ in character 
several years before this word arrived from Germany.”4 Or, as he 
writes more precisely, “[…] the Soviet state has acquired a totalita-
rian-bureaucratic character”. (TROTSKY, 1967, p. 100). As used by 
Trotsky and other leftists, the term “totalitarian” as applied to the 
Soviet Union and the Communist parties was used not in compari-
son to bourgeois democracy but in contrast to the notion of socia-
list democracy. Of course, this is not only quite different but also 
the antithesis of the Cold War usage of totalitarianism, which was 
used not only to attack Soviet Communism, but also to attempt to 
discredit Marxism and the entire socialist project.
An understanding of the totalitarian character of Soviet 
Communism in Trotsky’s sense is essential in attempting to 
comprehend the role of the Soviet Union and the Communist 
International in Latin America, though not because the Soviets 
ever had the capacity to export and to impose such totalitaria-
nism there. In this article then, the totalitarian character of Soviet 
Communism means the absolute and undemocratic subordination 
of the labor movement to the interests of the ruling Soviet bureau-
cracy, which led to the grotesque distortion of socialist ideals. In 
addition, whatever their immediate objectives or capacity at the 
moment, Latin American Communist parties always had as their 
principal goal the creation of a one-party state with a bureaucra-
tic command economy such as existed in the Soviet Union.5 The 
4  Trotsky (1967, p. 100).
5  Soviet Communism’s real goals could be seen in its conquest of Eastern 
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Soviet Union, for strategic and logistical reasons, could not always 
pursue that objective, but whatever the vicissitudes and line of the 
Soviet Union at any particular moment, subordination to Soviet 
Communism threw the working class far off course, as democracy 
as both the means  and the goal of socialism disappeared. The 
embrace of and influence of Soviet Communism on Cuba only 
confirmed the long-term objective, that is, the establishment of 
totalitarian states. 
3 MAJOR SCHOOLS OF INTERPRETATION 
The Communist International (CI) and the influence of the 
Soviet Union in Latin America has been the subject of an extensive 
critical literature generally dominated by the Cold War perspec-
tive. Some Communist writers defended the Communists’ global 
role. William Z. Foster, a major figure in the Communist Party 
USA for decades — a prominent U.S. labor leader, delegate to the 
Communist International in the 1920s, Communist Party candi-
date for U.S. president, and the party’s leader from 1945 to 1957 
(BARRETT, 1999) — was a loyal supporter of Joseph Stalin, the 
head of the Soviet Union. Foster wrote both a History of the Three 
Internationals (1955) and an Outline Political History of the Americas 
(1951), which included a chapter on “The Russian Revolution 
and the Communist Movement” in which he discussed the CI in 
Latin America. (FOSTER, 1951; 1955). Foster’s books retrospecti-
vely staunchly defended — from a Stalinist6 point of view—every 
major zig-zag of the Soviet political line. Regarding the CI in Latin 
America, Foster argued that: 
Europe and the imposition of Communist governments there after 1945. One 
could also see that tendency in Spain during the Civil War (1936-1939) as the 
Communists and the Soviet Union tended gradually to take over the Republican 
government while also attempting to exterminate the socialists of the Partido 
Obrero de Unificación Marxista (POUM) and the anarchists. On this question see 
Peirats (1971). 
6 The term Stalinist here is not an epithet. Foster would certainly have called 
himself a Stalinist throughout the period from 1927 to 1956 (and perhaps 
afterwards too).
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The Communist parties of the western he-
misphere, like those of the Old World, we-
re not created, as such, by the Russian 
Revolution. Rather they grew out of actual 
conditions in their respective nations and 
were matured by the experiences of the great 
Russian Revolution in establishing socialism. 
(FOSTER, 1951, p. 376).
While it is true as he states that in several Latin American coun-
tries the new Communist Parties emerged from the older Socialist 
parties and anarchist labor movements, Foster avoids the issue of 
the CI’s well-known role in determining the leadership, policies, 
and practices of those parties, which were in no way autonomous. 
Foster’s official histories provide some useful information but 
show no desire or willingness to engage critically issues in the CI’s 
history.
The U.S. government, dominant world capitalist power and 
Cold War opponent of the Soviet Union, studied the Soviet Union 
and the CI in Latin America extensively and worked to subvert 
their influence. State Department and CIA archives are filled with 
reports on the Communists. We see the results of such research in 
the work of Rollie Poppino, a U.S. intelligence research specialist 
from 1954-1961 and later a professor of Latin American History 
at the University of California at Davis (ROLLIE…, 2011), who 
produced a quite useful study, International Communism in Latin 
America: A History of the Movement 1917-1963, a book surprisin-
gly devoid of any explicit anti-Communist argument (POPPINO, 
1964). He argued, as many others would, that the “Latin American 
Communist Parties have never been free agents,” (POPPINO, 1964, 
p. 151) controlled as they always were by the CI and the Soviet 
Union. 
Some of the most influential writers on the Communist 
International, such as Robert J. Alexander and Manuel Caballero, 
were social democrats who, writing during the Cold War era, criti-
cized the CI and the Soviet Union for their opposition to democratic 
institutions such as parliamentary democracy (ALEXANDER, 1957; 
CABALLERO, 1986). Alexander, a professor at Rutgers University 
whose book Communism in Latin America was the standard 
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history for decades, became a kind of “State Department socialist” 
(BIOGRAPHICAL…, [s.d.]). A former Socialist Party member who 
later joined the Social Democrats USA and then Americans for 
Democratic Action as well as the Council on Foreign Relations, he 
collaborated with the former Communist Jay Lovestone, director 
of the International Affairs Department of the AFL-CIO and with 
the U.S. State Department. Alexander was also part of President 
John F. Kennedy’s task force that, following the Cuban Revolution, 
recommended the creation of the Alliance for Progress, a develo-
pment program intended to serve as a counter to the influence of 
Cuba (RABE, 1999).
An explicit anti-Communist, Alexander believed that the 
Soviet Union controlled and set the agenda of the Latin American 
Communist parties and believed they were a threat both Latin 
American nations and U.S. interests. But he thought that the 
problem was not to be solved militarily but rather politically. A 
critic of Latin American dictatorships, he called upon “[…] the 
United States and other non-Communist countries to demonstrate 
to the Latin American peoples that they can offer Latin America 
more effective aid in achieving its goals of higher living stan-
dards, more equitable distribution of income, and political demo-
cracy than can the Communists” (ALEXANDER, 1957, p. 17). He 
argued that “recognition of the true nature of the Latin American 
Communist Parties is all the more necessary, because the salva-
tion of the region from the Communists lies precisely in the real 
indigenous social reforms, agrarian reforms, and radical nationa-
lists or anti-imperialists” (ALEXANDER, 1957, p. 30).
Another social democratic critic, Manuel Caballero (1931-2010), 
who went from the Central University of Venezuela (UCV) to the 
University of London to earn his Ph.D., authored some 50 books on 
his country’s history and politics. He began his political activism as 
a teenage opponent of the dictator Marcos Pérez Jiménez, joining 
the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV), though later he left to 
join the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), a group which criticized 
the models of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party, even-
tually breaking with Marxism and becoming a social democratic 
party. Caballero, a writer for former Communist and ex-guerillero 
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Teodoro Petkoff’s newspaper Tal Cual, a voice of MAS, won the 
National Prize for Journalism in 1979 and the National History Prize 
in 1994. Caballero later became a fierce critic of President Hugo 
Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution. His book Latin America 
and the Comintern, 1919-1943 (1986) dismissed the Communist 
International for its extreme centralization, verticality, and lack 
of democracy, as well as for its lack of interest in Latin America, 
for its view that Latin America’s revolution would only come after 
revolutions in Europe and the United States, and for its failure 
to succeed anywhere in Latin America in its revolutionary goals 
(CABALLERO, 1986, p. 149 - 155).
A former revolutionary socialist who became a social demo-
crat was no less critical of the Communist International’s record 
in Latin America, even going so far as to dismiss it (ALBA, 1968, 
p. 118).7 Víctor Alba (1916-2003), born Pere Pagès i Elies in 
Barcelona, Cataluña, in the Spanish state, became involved as a 
teenager during the Spanish Civil War period in the Bloque Obero 
Campesino (BOC) and then in the Partido Obrero de Unificación 
Marxista (POUM), an alliance of left and right Communists who 
had left or been expelled from the Communist Party. He was later 
a writer for the party’s publications Última Hora and La Batalla. The 
POUM, fighting General Francisco Franco’s fascists and suffering 
violent attacks from the Stalinist Communist Party,8 formed Alba’s 
early revolutionary socialist politics of opposition to both capita-
lism and bureaucratic Communism.
Arrested and imprisoned for six years by Franco’s dictatorship 
and then freed in 1943, Alba entered France where he worked with 
Albert Camus on his journal Combat. Four years later he moved to 
Mexico, where he produced hundreds of articles and a number of 
books in Catalan, Spanish, and English. In 1957 he moved to the 
United States, becoming a professor at the University of Kansas 
and then at Kent State University in Ohio (MULLAN, 2003). By the 
7  Alba wrote, “A history of the labor movement in Latin America could perhaps 
be written with no more than passing reference to Communism” (ALBA, 1968, p. 
118). As his book suggested, this was clearly going too far.
8  Most famously the murder by torture of POUM leader Andrés Nin Pérez.
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1960s he had given up his revolutionary socialist views to become 
a social democrat writing for publications such as Dissent. He dedi-
cated one scathing chapter of his 1968 book Politics and the Labor 
Movement in Latin America to the “The Communist Movement” in 
which he excoriated the Communists for their anti-democratic, 
often conservative, sometimes disastrous, and always self-serving 
policies in every period.9 Other such social democratic interpreta-
tions also existed.10
Writing a decade later, Michael Löwy offered a critique from a 
different point of view. His “Puntos de referencia para una historia 
del Marxismo en América Latino,” written in 1979, is the intro-
duction to his useful collection of Communist and other leftist 
documents titled El marxismo en América Latina (de 1909 a nuestros 
días): Antología (LÖWY, 1982). Löwy, born to Austrian immigrants 
in Brazil in 1938, studied at the University of São Paulo and earned 
his Ph.D. at the Sorbonne; he later taught at a number of univer-
sities in various parts of the world. In France he worked with the 
League Communiste Revolutionnãire, a section of the Trotskyist 
Fourth International, during a period when it embraced Fidel Castro 
and the Cuban Revolution and then Ernesto “Che” Guevara’s call 
for guerrilla groups (focos) to carry out armed struggle in Latin 
America. Löwy’s critique of Communism in Latin America, infor-
med by Trotskyist politics, is critical of the Communist International 
under Stalin and his successors. Löwy argued that the left should 
pursue “permanent revolution,” the carrying out in a continuous 
fashion of the bourgeois democratic and socialist revolution. His 
principal objection was to the Communist policy of the Popular 
Front and to its “stageism”: that is, the idea that a bourgeois revo-
lution must succeed and be consolidated before there could be a 
9  Víctor Alba, Politics, (1968, p. 118 – 162).
10  We might also mention Sheldon B. Liss, an American academic of social 
democratic views, put together a compendium called Marxist Thought in Latin 
America published in 1984. Liss (1984), who prided himself on his “non-sectarian 
perspective,” produced a book discussing Latin American left intellectuals 
from nine countries which, while useful as a reference work, was because 
of its eclectic, evenhanded, and ecumenical approach of little value for those 
attempting critically understand Latin American Communism and other left 
currents.
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socialist revolution. Löwy embraced the Cuban Revolution becau-
se he saw it as a form of what Trotsky called “permanent revo-
lution,” which Löwy thought had also happened in Yugoslavia, 
China, and Vietnam (LÖWY, 1981).11 This, despite the fact that 
these national revolutions were not led by the working class and 
in no way furthered democracy. He was virtually uncritical of the 
Cuban Revolution, which he referred to as having created a socia-
list state, and praised it for having revived Marxist theory and a 
revolutionary perspective based on the idea of the “uninterrup-
ted revolution” (LÖWY, 1981, p. 11 - 59). At that time, Löwy did 
not deal with the fact that Cuba had become a one-party state, 
had entered the Soviet camp by 1962, and that by 1971 Cuba had 
completely assimilated to the Soviet Union’s economic and politi-
cal structures (FARBER, 2007).
Beginning in the 1980s, a group of revisionist historians argued 
against the Cold War historians’ idea that the Soviet Union control-
led and directed the national Communist parties, emphasizing the 
autonomous role of the national parties (ISSERMAN, 1982). Some 
contemporary historians have called for a revision of Communist 
history that would reduce the role of the Communist International. 
Seeing the CI as less significant, they would emphasize each coun-
try’s specific social and cultural elements. For example, Daniel 
Kersfeld, a professor of Latin American Studies at the National 
Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), has written a short 
paper about the use of the Comintern archives in Russia for writing 
the history of the Communism with the title: “From Esotericism 
to Marketing: Approaches to the Comintern Archives” (2011). 
Kersfeld calls for a revision in the study of Communism, arguing 
that Cold War or post-Cold War prejudices, such as the use of 
the word “totalitarianism” to describe the Soviet Union and other 
Communist nations, are practices that have warped our perception. 
He argues that, “The opening of the archives of the Communist 
International meant a new analysis of the history of communist 
11  This book was later reissued with the same title (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 
[2010]), though it excised Löwy’s earlier positive case studies of the twentieth 
century revolutions, leaving the bare bones of his theory. See La Botz (2011).
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parties, especially in relation to their rise and consolidation, their 
debates and internal conflicts, and their ties, not always harmo-
nious, with Moscow” (KERSFELD, 2011, p. 73). In fact, however, 
whatever their debates and conflicts  were, and they were many, 
in the end Latin American parties and their members had to follow 
the line set in Moscow, as confirmed by recent studies in the 
Comintern archives.12
A recent study of the Latin American left edited by the U.S. 
academic Carlos Aguirre, Militantes, intelectuales y revoluciona-
rios: Ensayos sobre marxismo e izquierda en América Latina, has 
few essays on the Communist International and the Communist 
Parties, but those in the collection support the view that the CI 
dictated international Communist policy, even if Latin America 
posed particular theoretical and political challenges, such the 
large indigenous population (AGUIRRE, 2013).13 Nothing in recent 
studies leads us to change our understanding of Soviet domination 
of the Comintern or of its periodization. The emphasis on local and 
cultural factors, an approach common to post-modernism, tends to 
minimize international geopolitical factors, reduces the role of the 
International, and produces a mosaic picture of Communism. But 
when we step back it is an abstract painting in which the funda-
mental form of Soviet Communism’s influence becomes vague.
The interpretation offered here differs from those of Alexander 
and Alba because it does not see international Communism’s prin-
cipal problem as its opposition to “democracy,” which, after all, 
means for those historians a formally democratic, liberal capitalist 
state. It also differs from Caballero in that it does not see inter-
national Communism’s primary fault or weakness as its failure 
to carry out the revolutions it proposed, which would have led to 
societies that looked like Eastern European ones in the Cold War 
12  Spenser (1999). While she makes no explicit general statement about the 
Comintern’s relationship to the national Communist Parties, it is clear she 
believes the latter were subordinate to the former, writing for example that 
after 1928, “The Comintern gave orders to Communist parties to destroy their 
rivals” (SPENSER, 1999, p. 18). Klehr, Haynes and Firsov (1995) go much further 
asserting the International’s domination of the CPUSA.
13   A collection of 16 essays on a variety of left experiences. 
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period. And it differs from Löwy in that it does not see the Cuban 
Revolution of 1959 as having produced a socialist society or as 
having contributed to the development of revolutionary working 
class movements and socialist theory in the region. Finally, unlike 
post-modern critics, one must understand that the Soviet Union 
and the Communist International, whatever national tensions 
arose, directed the Communist enterprise.
The central question facing working class movements in every 
country is always its ability to create an independent movement, 
one that is not controlled by either capitalist parties or by the 
governments or the bureaucratic Communist parties loyal to one 
or another of the Communist states (having in mind here not only 
the Soviet Union, but also Cuba and Communist China). While 
there was a tremendous initial enthusiasm around the world inclu-
ding in Latin America for the Bolshevik or Soviet revolution, alrea-
dy by the mid-1920s the Soviet Union — through the Communist 
International — was imposing its national agenda on the interna-
tional workers’ movement by fiat. This meant a series of left and 
right gyrations that disoriented the various Communist parties and 
made them worthless as vehicles for an internationalist and demo-
cratic revolutionary workers’ movements.
4 PERIODIZATION OF THE COMMuNIST INTERNATIONAL 
AND SOVIET INFLuENCE
The role of the Communists in world politics and in Latin 
America has been divided into several periods that are ackno-
wledged by virtually all scholars. First, the period of European 
Revolution from 1921-1923; second, the period of capitalist stabili-
zation, the strategy of the United Front of Communists, Socialists, 
and other leftists, and of the Bolshevization of the Comintern 
parties from 1924-1927; the Third Period from 1928 to 1935 in 
which the Communists attacked the Socialists as “social fascists” 
and attempted to turn working class struggles into insurrections; 
fourth, the first period of the Popular Front from 1935 until 1939 
involving Communist unity with anti-fascist parties of all sorts; 
fifth, the brief period of the Hitler-Stalin Pact from 1939 to Nazi 
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Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941; and sixth, 
the return in 1941 to the Popular Front, including the dissolution 
of the Comintern in 1943, though continuing with that approach 
even with the outbreak of the Cold War. That is, the Communist 
parties continued the Popular Front approach, meaning unity with 
labor and bourgeois parties within the context of “peaceful coexis-
tence” with the capitalist powers. Despite the Cuban Revolution of 
1959, the Communists did not change their fundamental commit-
ment to the Popular Front, which remained their strategy until the 
fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. The Soviet Union’s foreign policy 
and diplomacy, driven by economic and military needs, sometimes 
created particular national tensions, but the overall periodization 
remains the same around the world.
As Marxists, the Bolsheviks believed that their theory of revolu-
tion was universal because capitalism had become universal, even 
if its development was uneven.14 As Marxists, they believed that the 
working class would lead the peasantry in revolution. As Leninists, 
they believed that their disciplined party, which had succeeded 
in leading the first successful workers’ revolution, represented a 
model for the world socialist movements. They believed that soviet 
power, the organization of a government of workers and peasants 
into councils could also be a model for the world. They saw post-
World War I Europe—and Germany in particular — as the center 
and most advanced arena of the struggle for workers’ power and 
socialism. But as a nation that stretched across Asia and a coun-
try where peasants constituted a majority, they believed that the 
Russian Revolutionary model was appropriate for the colonial 
world as well.
Any reading of the documents, of biographies of Latin American 
leftists, of histories of the Communist parties and the Communist 
International, and of Latin American-Soviet history makes clear 
that the Soviet Union and the Communist International determined 
14  Post-colonial theorists have made the argument that the theories of Marx, 
Lenin, Trotsky, Luxemburg and others were “eurocentric,” though it would 
be better to say that it is universal. On this question see Chibber (2013) and 
Anderson (2016).
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and dictated the overall political direction of the national parties. 
The CI sent its agents to Latin America and Latin American party 
leaders traveled to Moscow to receive Stalin’s blessing, much as 
Catholic cardinals and bishops went to the Vatican. There they were 
informed of the line that they were to carry out. Latin American 
Communists went to Moscow for education and training. The Latin 
American Communist party leaders met and cooperated with the 
Soviet secret police (NKVD, later GPU) who were also involved in 
the Communist International and attached to Soviet embassies.
The Soviet Union and the Communist International control-
led the Latin American Communist parties in much the same way 
that the U.S. State Department — working through the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and hand in glove with the American 
Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) 
(RADOSH, 1969) — directed capitalist political parties and bureau-
cratic labor unions in its Latin American sphere of influence. On 
the other hand, when it could not control governments in Latin 
America, the United States was likely to send in the Marines and 
overthrow the offending political party, as it did in Haiti, Nicaragua, 
Guatemala, or the Dominican Republic (WILLIAMS, 1980; KINZER, 
2006), much like the Soviet Union did in its sphere of influence in 
Eastern Europe where it suppressed rebellions and deposed gover-
nments with tanks and troops in East Germany, Poland, Hungary 
or Czechoslovakia (HARMAN, 1974). Until the Cuban Revolution of 
1959 the Soviet Union never intervened directly in Latin America, 
which formed part of the United States’ sphere, just as the United 
States did not intervene directly in the Soviet sphere of Eastern 
Europe.
5 THE FOuNDING OF THE COMMuNIST INTERNATIONAL 
AND LATIN AMERICA COMMuNIST PARTIES
The Russian Revolution of October 1917, a workers and 
peasants’ revolutionary movement that under the leadership of 
the Bolshevik Party overthrew the capitalist Russian Provisional 
government and handed power to the soviets (councils), had an 
enormous impact on the left throughout the world. The radicals’ 
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dream of a workers’ revolution that would take power and begin to 
create a socialist society appeared to be taking place before their 
eyes. Hundreds of thousands of workers in countries around the 
world suddenly wanted to be Bolsheviks, to create Soviets, and to 
begin to construct Communism. The Russian Revolution galvani-
zed the socialist workers’ movement and even before the creation 
of the Communist International, many on the left oriented them-
selves toward the new world center. Russia, the workers’ country, 
became a magnetic point to which the compasses now all pointed, 
though as Victor Serge wrote, few even in Europe at the time had 
any idea what a soviet or a Bolshevik was.
Vladimir Lenin, Leon Trotsky, Grigory Zinoviev and other 
Bolshevik leaders had an internationalist outlook, but their expe-
rience and their vision were primarily European. They had come of 
age politically within European Social Democracy and the Second 
International, led by the German Social Democratic Party. The 
crisis that made their revolution possible was the Great War of 
1914-1918, which was fundamentally a European conflict. They 
were anti-imperialists who understood that Great Britain’s domi-
nant power was based on its colonies, and they would support the 
revolutionary movements in those colonies, but they knew little 
about them and had had virtually no contact with them. If they had 
an understanding of any region of the world outside of Europe, 
it was Asia, because while its center was in Europe, Russia was 
largely an Asian nation, and Great Britain’s most important colony 
was India. Africa and Latin America were practically terra incognita 
to the Bolsheviks.
The failure of the Socialist International to oppose the outbreak 
of World War I, as each Socialist Party rallied to support its gover-
nment, led to that International’s collapse. The anti-war socialist 
left wing held meetings at Zimmerwald in 1915 and at Kienthal 
in 1916 (both in Switzerland) and formed a network that laid the 
basis for the creation of a new International. The Bolsheviks, now 
called the Communist Party, convened the founding conference 
of the Communist International that took place in Moscow from 
March 2-6, 1919; some 54 delegates principally from European 
nations participated — 34 of them voting delegates. Also present 
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were representatives of labor and socialist movements of 
Azerbaijan, China, Korea, Georgia, Turkey, and Turkistan, but 
no Latin Americans participated. The Founding Congress’ agen-
da, quite understandably, dealt entirely with the Russian situation 
and the post-war conditions in Europe. The new CI, controlled by 
its executive committee, was seen as the headquarters of a world 
revolutionary party organized along quasi-military lines.
After the First Congress, however, Lenin sent Bolshevik orga-
nizers to various nations. To Mexico the CI sent Mikhail Borodin, 
who found a small cluster of revolutionary socialists, among them 
US anti-war activist Charles Francis Phillips and the Indian natio-
nalist M.N. Roy and his US wife Evelyn Trent Roy. Borodin selec-
ted the Roys to attend the Second Congress of the Communist 
International, though in the end it was M.N. Roy and Phillips who 
went.
Only with the Second Congress of the CI held in 1920 did impe-
rialism and colonialism become central topics of discussion while 
a Latin American nation — Mexico — was represented, and Latin 
America as a region become a topic of limited discussion. M.N. 
Roy, who arrived as a delegate for Mexico but left as the dele-
gate of India, became a major figure at the Congress and in the 
International. He debated Lenin over the question of movements 
for independence in the colonial world, with Lenin presenting a 
position supporting the national bourgeoisie’s leadership of them, 
while Roy argued that the national bourgeoisie would capitulate 
to imperialism. In the end, the Congress surprisingly adopted both 
resolutions (HAITHCOX, 2015).
Phillips played little role. He did, however, have an interes-
ting conversation with Lenin about the Mexican peasantry. Lenin, 
confessing that he had only fragmentary knowledge about Mexico, 
asked Phillips about the role of the Mexican Communist Party in 
the countryside. Phillips explained that much of the rural popula-
tion was indigenous, a fact about which Lenin had been ignorant. 
When Lenin asked if they had publications in the Indian langua-
ges, Phillips explained that the indigenous people were illiterate. 
In that case, said Lenin, they must have organizers who spoke the 
Indian language, because, said Lenin, “those Indians should be 
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your number one objective in the countryside” (SHIPMAN, 1993, p. 
125; GóMEZ , 1964, p. 42 - 43).  This would also be the view seve-
ral years later of the Peruvian José Carlos Mariátegui in a docu-
ment that he wrote for the debate in the Communist International 
(MARIÁTEGUI , 1991, p. 210 - 257).
Speaking at the Congress on the national and colonial ques-
tions, Lenin boldly asserted that the Communists would provide 
leadership to the colonial peoples and their largely peasant popu-
lations. As he stated:
The preponderance of precapitalist rela-
tionships is still the main determining featu-
re in these countries so that there can be no 
question of a purely proletarian movement in 
them. There is practically no industrial pro-
letariat in these countries. Nevertheless, we 
have assumed, we must assume, the role of 
leader even there (RIDDELL, 1991, p. 214).
 Lenin went on to add that Communist-led organizations could 
organize  peasant  soviets  even  in  the  economically  “backward 
countries”. While Lenin was thinking principally about China and 
India, his audacious prescription for Communist leadership of the 
colonial nations and their largely peasant populations could presu- 
mably also be applied to Latin America. 
 It was the brilliant US radical Louis Fraina, also speaking at the 
session on the national and colonial question, who first introduced 
the question of Latin America explicitly, arguing that if not actual 
colonies, Latin American nations were nevertheless both econo- 
mic and political colonies:
 All  of  Latin  America  must  be  regarded  as  a 
 colony of the United States, not just its colo- 
 nies in the strict sense such as the Philippines, 
 and  so  on.  The  United  States  completely 
 controls  Central  America  with  its  army  of 
 occupation.  But  it  also  controls  Mexico  and 
 South  America,  where  this  is  expressed  in 
 two ways. It does this, first, by economic and 
 financial  penetration,  which  has  increased 
 since the German enterprises in these coun- 
 tries were expropriated. Second it applies the 
 Monroe  Doctrine,  which  originally  protected 
 America  from  the  monarchical  system,  but 
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has become a tool for the consolidation of 
U.S. imperialism and its supremacy in Latin 
America (RIDDELL, 1991, p. 229).
He concluded that given this situation:
It is absolutely necessary to fight this imperia-
lism by launching revolutionary movements 
in Latin America, just as it is necessary to act 
against British imperialism by staring revolu-
tionary movement in its colonies (RIDDELL, 
1991, p. 229).
The Communist International sent three organizers to Mexico 
in the early 1920s: Charles Francis Phillips and Louis Fraina of the 
United States and Sen Katayama of Japan. While they succeeded in 
recruiting a few worker and peasant leaders, the Communists could 
not compete with the revolutionary nationalist ideology produ-
ced by the Mexican Revolution. While they did help to re-found 
the Mexican Communist Party on a broader base, it remained a 
small party with little impact, faced with severe repression. While 
it would stumble on through the 1920s, it remained a marginal 
political current (SPENSER, 2011, passim).
The Communist International’s ability to control and direct is 
affiliated parties in Latin America during the first decade — that 
is, from the founding of the International in 1918 until Stalin took 
command of the Soviet Union and of the International in 1927 — 
was extremely limited. From October 1917 until 1922, the Russian 
Communist government was preoccupied with foreign interven-
tion and a civil war. Following the end of the civil war, the leader-
ship was focused on ending the period of “War Communism” and 
implementing the New Economic Policy (NEP). Then in 1924, Lenin 
died, opening the period of factional struggle between Stalin, 
Kamenev, Zinoviev, Bukharin and Tomsky. At the same time, 
Zinoviev led the CI in the “Bolshevization” campaign, intended 
to make over all of the affiliated parties around the world in the 
image of the Bolshevik party, but also as serving as a campaign 
against Trotskyism and Luxemburgism.15
15  Zinoviev’s Bolshevization project was principally an attack on Trotsky, but 
lumped his ideas together with those of Rosa Luxemburg (GEIER, [s.d.]).
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Until 1923 when the Communist International’s attempt to 
foment a German Revolution failed, attention had been on Europe. 
But then Russian Communists and the CI turned their attention 
from Europe to China. For the Russian Communists Latin America 
remained distant and — with the exception of revolutionary 
Mexico — for the moment politically irrelevant. The Russians 
and other European Communists tended to be ignorant of Latin 
America’s history, its economic structures, its society, culture, and 
peoples. The CI languages were Russian, German, and French; 
few Communists knew Spanish, and they had no idea about the 
indigenous languages of the continent. Latin American capitals 
remained a week or more away by train and steamship, though 
messages with instructions could be and were sent by cable. Still, 
the Communists believed they had a universal plan for world revo-
lution. Moreover, the prestige of the Russian Revolution and the 
Communist International’s role as the leading body of the party 
of world revolution meant that the CI’s theory of revolution and 
of the revolutionary party were transmitted to the Latin American 
left and then to its new Communist parties, however incompletely 
and inexactly.
How was the Communist International received in Latin 
America? Mexico was unique in that it was in the throes of a long, 
bloody, and deeply divided revolution and civil war, which was 
coming to a conclusion just as the CI was established. As mentio-
ned above, Mexico’s Communist Party, founded by foreigners 
living in Mexico, had only a small following at first; and the new 
party soon found itself in competition with both the declining anar-
chist movement and, more important, the rising Mexican nationa-
list state. In Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, countries with large 
European immigrant populations and Socialist parties of some 
significance, the Communist parties emerged between 1918 and 
1921 from the Socialist parties, much as had happened in Europe, 
through a process of splits over the Bolshevik model and the 
famous “21 conditions” required to join the CI (LENIN, 1920). Only 
the Chilean Socialist Workers’ Party went over in its entirety to the 
Communist International. In Brazil, where anarchism dominated 
the labor movement, small groups of intellectuals came together 
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to found the Brazilian Communist Party in 1922. The Communist 
Party of Cuba was organized by a group of students in 1925. 
Communist Parties in Guatemala and El Salvador were also esta-
blished that year. Ecuador and Panama had Communist parties by 
1926. Columbia, Paraguay, and Peru had no Communist party until 
1928, while Venezuela did not have a Communist Party until the 
early 1930s and Bolivia until the beginning of the 1940s (POPPINO, 
1964, p. 55 – 95; 224 - 229). The Communist parties that were esta-
blished in Latin America between 1918 and 1928 experienced a 
variety of political and organizational crises, some caused by the 
factional struggles in the Soviet Union, and consequently most had 
little significant impact on their respective nations.16
The CI made anti-imperialism a major focus of its Latin 
American political work. In 1925, the Communist International 
played a central role in creating a united front with other groups in 
Latin America to create the Anti-Imperialist League of the Americas 
(Liga Antiimperialista de las Americas - LADLA), involving Latin 
American intellectuals with a variety of views. The LADLA had as 
its major project the “Hands Off Nicaragua” campaign and support 
for Augusto César Sandino and his fight against the U.S. Marines. 
In 1927, the LADLA participated in the International Congress 
against Colonial Oppression and Imperialism held in Brussels. The 
Congress Resolution on Latin America called for a struggle against 
the rival Yankee and British imperialisms in the region. The reso-
lution condemned the role of the AFL in Latin America, called for 
a united front of Latin American labor unions, and for their invol-
vement in the anti-imperialist movement (RÉSOLUTION…, 1927). 
This united front approach ended abruptly in 1928, only a year 
from its initiation.
In 1929, with Joseph Stalin having taken hold of the Soviet and 
the Communist International, and now advocating the notion of 
viability of “socialism in one country” things changed dramatically. 
As former Spanish Communist Party member Fernando Claudín 
16  Perhaps the most important and interesting experience was that of Peru, 
where Carlos Mariátegui founded the Socialist Party of Peru, which affiliated 
with the CI. See La Botz (2012). 
The CommunisT inTernaTional, The sovieT union, 
and Their impaCT on The laTin ameriCa Workers’ movemenT
Tensões Mundiais, ForTaleza, v. 13, n. 24, p. 67-106 2017   |  87
(1975, p 76 - 77) writes, “from the moment when the building 
of socialism in the USSR was seen as the essential determining 
factor of the world revolution, all other movements were reduced 
objectively to a subordinate role, and it was from that angle that 
they had to be regarded in the Comintern’s strategy and tactics”. 
Exactly when that moment occurred is unclear, but it had certainly 
taken place by the time that Stalin took power. Only after 1928, 
when Stalin had taken control of both the Soviet Union and the 
Communist International, did the CI and its Latin American parties 
begin to have a more significant effect, though that was often 
unfortunate and sometimes disastrous.
6 THIRD PERIOD
With Stalin now leading the Communist International, at its 
Sixth World Congress held in Moscow in 1928, it entered its “Third 
Period”. In Communist terms, the first period, from 1918 to 1923 
had been one of revolutionary upheaval; the second period from 
1923 to 1928, one of capitalist consolidation; but the Third Period 
was expected to be one of capitalist crisis and new revolutionary 
opportunities, and Communists were directed to seize them. The 
Communist International leadership advanced the theory of “social 
fascism,” insisting that the Social Democratic and Labor parties 
were not simply reformist, but actually fascist, social fascist. 
Consequently the Communists could not use the united front stra-
tegy of allying with the Socialists as they had in the earlier periods; 
in fact, the Communists must and would engage in struggles, 
sometimes violent, against the Socialists. The Communists in this 
period of “class against class” would also attempt to initiate and to 
lead revolutionary insurrections. In Latin America they would do 
so with terrible results.
The Comintern held a Latin American Conference in December 
1927, attended by eight representatives of Latin American coun-
tries as well as two Comintern representatives. The following year, 
the Communist International moved its Latin American Bureau or 
Secretariat from Moscow to Buenos Aires under the leadership of 
a Lithuanian named Guralsky. There were at the time about 25,000 
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Communists altogether in all of the Latin American parties. The 
new secretariat was given responsibility to strengthen the CPs, to 
found labor unions and peasant organizations, increase publishing 
of literature, and to enforce CI discipline on the parties. One Latin 
American declared that the Communists had finally “discovered 
Latin America” (ALBA, 1968, p. 122 - 126). The first Latin American 
Communist Conference in Buenos Aires followed in 1929, with 28 
delegates from fourteen countries. The secretariat led by Guralsky, 
a Bulgarian named Stoyan Mineevich, known as Stepanov, and 
Victorio Codovilla, took charge of directing the Latin American 
parties in the Third Period (ALBA, 1968, p. 125 - 130).
The two most significant Communist Third Period deba-
cles occurred in Colombia and El Salvador. The Communists in 
Colombia in 1928 intervened in a banana workers strike and 
attempted to turn it into an insurrection with the goal of sparking 
revolution. In response the military intervened, eventually leading 
to the death of over 1,000, with 3,600 wounded, and 500 arrested, 
most of those going to prison. Refusing to work with liberals and 
socialists, the Communists led the strike to a catastrophic defeat 
(ALBA, 1968, p. 127).
More disastrous was the Communist leadership of a peasant 
rebellion against the military dictatorship that had taken power 
in El Salvador in December 1931. When the military government 
refused to recognize the Communist Party’s claim that it had won 
the 1932 election, the party decided to organize an insurrection 
(GOULD, 2008; ANDERSON, 1971). The government massacred 
somewhere between 10,000 and 30,000 rebels. Among those 
executed was Agustín Farabundo Martí, the head of the party. 
Robert J. Alexander wrote, “The suppression of the revolt of 1932 
destroyed the Communist Party, all of its front organizations, and 
the labor movement as well and installed [Maximiliano Hernández] 
Martínez as a dictator, a regime which lasted for a dozen years” 
(ALEXANDER, 1957, p. 366 - 371). The 1932 revolt also contribu-
ted to the decline if not the complete disappearance of indigenous 
identity in El Salvador (CHING; TILLEY, 1998). The Salvadoran CP 
was not reorganized until 1936.
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The Third Period’s impact everywhere, including in Latin 
America, was firstly to strengthen the grip of the Comintern on 
Communist parties, purging them of all dissident elements;17 
secondly, to give Communist leadership to adventurous, ultra-left 
actions that led to devastating results; and thirdly, through that 
process, to create a hardened cadre of absolutely loyal Communists 
and courageous fighters, veterans of struggles against the capi-
talist and landlord classes, against reformist socialist parties and 
labor unions. The Third Period created Communist parties made 
up of men and women who were prepared to follow Stalin’s 
International whatever course it took. None of this contributed 
to the building of that independent socialist workers movement 
which stood at the heart of Marxism. As Nicola Miller writes, “The 
Communist International failed to turn any political situation to 
its advantage during the years 1917-1935, largely because of the 
rigidity of its model and its lack of interest in the actual conditions 
of Latin America.” (MILLER, 1989, p. 41).
7 POPuLAR FRONT
With Adolf Hitler’s ascension to power in Germany in 1933, 
Stalin and the Soviet leadership began to rethink Communist 
policy. Hitler soon destroyed the German Communist Party, the 
largest outside of Russia, and his Reich represented an imminent 
threat to the Soviet Union and the ruling Communist bureaucracy. 
Stalin abandoned the sectarian and ultra-left Third Period and in 
mid-1936 adopted the Popular Front. The Popular Front called upon 
the Communists to ally everywhere with all anti-fascist forces, 
which generally meant not only with the labor and socialist parties, 
but also with bourgeois parties, and even in some places with 
thoroughly reactionary governments and parties so long as they 
opposed fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. While Communist leaders 
and cadres still hoped to bring about revolutions that would create 
governments like that of the Soviet Union, their participation in 
17  The dissidents often went off to found their own leftwing parties, Trotskyist, 
Socialist, or dissident Communist.
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labor coalitions with socialist and nationalist unionists and their 
adoption of a regular electoral political approach, together with 
rhetoric in praise of bourgeois democracy, made the Communists 
more acceptable and even popular in various countries.
The Popular Front was undergirded by a theory of revolution 
similar to that of the Social Democratic parties of the late nine-
teen and early twentieth centuries. It was a theory of economic 
development through stages. Latin America, it was argued, was a 
region where feudal social structures still existed; where a landed 
aristocracy held as vassals the vast impoverished peasantry. 
Consequently, the central struggle was for bourgeois democracy. 
Latin American revolutionaries should therefore organize workers 
and peasants and seek an alliance with the “progressive national 
bourgeoisie.” Once a capitalist economy and a liberal state had 
been established, it would be possible for the working class to 
undertake the struggle for socialism under the leadership of the 
Communist Party. The theory was complicated, however, by the 
fact that the capitalist governments were now divided between the 
liberal democracies and the fascists, so Communists had to support 
the democracies (England, France, and the United States) through 
the construction of the Popular Front, though in some cases they 
might even support reactionaries or dictators who formed part of 
the anti-fascist alliance. Leftist groups that attempted to fight for 
socialism might disrupt the anti-fascist movement and derail the 
struggle for bourgeois democracy.
Chile became the showcase for the Latin American Popular 
Front. There the Communists, who had opposed the short-lived 
Socialist Republic of 1932 led by Marmaduke Grove, now sought 
an alliance with the Socialists and Trotskyists (ALEXANDER, 1973, 
p. 194 - 197; MUñOZ CARRILLO, 2014). Socialist and Communist 
labor unionists united in the Confederación de Trabjadores de Chile 
(CTCH). Then the Socialists and Communists, together with the 
bourgeois Democratic Party joined together to form the Popular 
Front. The Front’s candidate, Pedro Aguirre Cerda of the bourgeois 
Radical Party, won the presidential race, but the Communists refu-
sed to accept any ministerial portfolios. In no other Latin American 
country did the Communist Party succeed in creating a Popular 
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Front, though in Mexico they backed the government of Lázaro 
Cárdenas, considering that to be that country’s unique version of 
the Popular Front. In other countries they backed capitalist parties 
and even dictatorships that supported the anti-fascist Allies.
With the negotiation of the Hitler-Stalin Pact, the Communists 
immediately found themselves isolated. The Communists refu-
sed to support the Allied nations in their struggle against Nazi 
Germany. Arguing that England and France were the imperialist 
aggressors, the Communists called for peace. The Communists’ 
position aligned them objectively with rightwing elite groups 
throughout Latin America that supported the Nazis against Great 
Britain, the dominant imperial power in the region at the time. The 
Hitler-Stalin Pact was, however, short-lived and with the inva-
sion of the Soviet Union in June of 1941, the Communists retur-
ned to the Popular Front and became the most ardent supports of 
the Allies against the Axis Powers. Everywhere the Communists 
became nationalists, patriots, and anti-fascists, quickly becoming 
acceptable and even popular once more. Again Chile became the 
showcase of the Popular Front, with the Communists becoming 
leaders of the CTCH and with three Communists becoming minis-
ters in the government. Once part of the Chilean government, the 
Communists worked against non-Communist unions and even 
assassinated socialists and anarcho-syndicalists in the streets 
(ALBA, 1968, p. 139). In Mexico, the Communist Party continued 
to support Cárdenas and the nationalist government party, while 
party members participated in attempts on the life of Leon Trotsky, 
who was eventually killed by a Spanish Communist (GALL, 1991).
With the Soviet Union allied with the “democracies” of the 
Allied Powers, that is, with the British, French, and U.S. empires, 
Stalin’s chief goal became winning and maintaining the good will 
of those governments. Earl Browder, head of the Communist Party 
USA and also the leader of the Latin American Secretariat of the 
Comintern, enthusiastically accepted and implemented these poli-
cies. Then, as Claudín writes, “the Comintern was dissolved quite 
suddenly, in the spring of 1943, on Stalin’s orders, so as to faci-
litate negotiations with Roosevelt and Churchill, whose aim was 
not merely to secure Germany’s defeat, but also to ensure the 
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partition of the world among the ‘Big Three’.” (CLAUDíN, 1975, p. 
18). During the war “[…] renouncing any intention of ‘fomenting 
worldwide revolution’ was the necessary condition for a far-rea-
ching agreement, based on a share-out of ‘spheres of influence,’ 
with American imperialism. And this was one of the essential aims 
of Stalin’s policy” writes Claudín (1975, p. 24).
The Communists became part of the “Grant Alliance” under the 
hegemony of the United States (CLAUDíN, 1975, p. 622). In Cuba, 
the Communists joined in an alliance with the U.S.-backed strong-
man Colonel Fulgencia Batista, a partnership that lasted from 
1938 to 1944. (CABALLERO, 1986, p. 120 - 129) In Nicaragua the 
Communists attempted to ingratiate themselves with the dictator 
Anastasio Somoza García (LA BOTZ, 2016, p. 112 - 113). The Latin 
American Communist parties supported other dictators as well, so 
long as they were part of the international anti-fascist political and 
military alliance. Nevertheless, despite the Communists’ support for 
dictators in some Latin American countries, the party grew in size, 
influence, and popularity in many. According to Claudín, “The Latin 
American parties combined had 90,000 members in 1939. Around 
1947 they had nearly half a million” (CLAUDíN, 1975, p. 309).
8 POST-WAR, COLD WAR COMMuNISM: CRISIS AND 
FRAGMENTATION
With the Allies’ victory over Germany in Europe and over Japan in 
the Pacific theater, the war ended and almost immediately the Cold 
War began. Winston Churchill’s “iron curtain” speech on March 4, 
1946 — “From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron 
curtain has descended across the continent” — can be taken as 
the inflection point (HINTON, 1946). The U.S. government brought 
together 21 American nations in 1948 to create the Organization of 
American States (OAS), which would become the principle politi-
cal vehicle for imposing U.S. policy on Latin America governments. 
The center of that policy was anti-Communism. The U.S. State 
Department and the new U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
working closely with the AFL-CIO began a campaign to reduce 
the power of the Communist Parties and labor federations in Latin 
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America. Many Latin American governments cooperated with the 
United States in the suppression of Communist activity, some of 
them like Mexico, quite enthusiastically. The Communists—even 
though they continued to advocate Popular Front politics—were 
put on the defensive throughout the Western Hemisphere from the 
late 1940s through the 1950s. In Guatemala where presidents Juan 
José Arévalo and Jacobo Árbenz led administrations that cham-
pioned agrarian reform, threatening the interests of a major U.S. 
corporation, the United Fruit Company, the Communist Party’s 
support for the government was used to justify a CIA inspired mili-
tary coup in 1954. The CIA specifically targeted Communists for 
assassination (DOYLE; KORNBLUH, 1997).
While the Comintern had dissolved in 1943, the Soviet Union 
continued through the Cominform (1947 - 1956) and later through 
the Soviet government and its embassies to set the line for the 
world’s Communist Parties, including those in Latin America. Top 
Communist Party leaders and intellectuals such as Caio Pardo 
Júnior in Brazil, found it very difficult to break with the Soviet 
Union, despite their differences (PERICÁS, 2016, p. 280).
Soviet Communism went into crisis in February 1956 with 
Russian Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s secret speech at the Twentieth 
Party Congress of the Communist Party, in which he denounced 
Stalin’s dictatorship, his cult of personality, and his crimes against 
Communist Party members and Soviet citizens. The speech soon 
fell into the hands of Israel and was passed onto the United States, 
which made the contents public (U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT, 
1956). The speech caused a profound crisis both within the Soviet 
Communist Party and the international Communist movement. 
Then, in October of 1956 the Hungarian people revolted against 
Soviet domination and Communist rule, a workers’ revolution 
against Communism that the Soviet Union put down with tanks. 
Soviet relations with the West remained based on the concept of 
“peaceful coexistence” and the conviction, as Khrushchev put it, 
“History is on our side; we will bury you” (WHITMAN, 1971). That 
is, that Soviet Communism and the global Communist movement 
would, in the long run, overcome capitalism. The Communist 
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parties in Latin America operating within that framework and 
within the Popular Front model — that is, pursuing social chan-
ge through parliamentary elections, progressive coalitions, and 
labor union struggles to improve workers’ lives — engaged in no 
revolutionary or insurrectional movements. It was precisely this 
opposition to revolution in the Western Hemisphere that led the 
Communists to turn away the young Cuban lawyer Fidel Castro.
The Cuban Revolution of 1959, led by Castro’s “26 of July” 
guerrillas in la sierra madre with support from student and labor 
groups in el llano, provided a new model of revolution for Latin 
America. The Cuban revolution had nothing to do with either Karl 
Marx’s theory of the revolutionary potential of the working class 
or with Lenin’s claim that the working class needed a Bolshevik-
style party. Nor did it follow any of Joseph Stalin’s various Third 
Period or Popular Front strategies; and it had even less to do with 
Khrushchev’s peaceful coexistence. Castro and his band of déclas-
sé revolutionaries, acting in small guerrilla bands and espousing 
a program of democracy and social reform, overthrew the Batista 
dictatorship. While the United States recognized Cuba almost 
immediately after the revolution, President Dwight D. Eisenhower 
and the CIA soon began to plot Castro’s overthrow and established 
an embargo of Cuba. When John F. Kennedy became president in 
1961 he used the CIA to organize the abortive Bay of Pigs inva-
sion in an attempt to overthrow Castro. Meanwhile Castro simul-
taneously declared Cuba socialist, and then brought Cuba into the 
Soviet camp, while in 1965 he merged his guerrilla organization 
with the Cuban Communist Party (FARBER, 2006).
Castro’s compañero Ernesto “Che” Guevara argued that the 
Cuban experience should be seen as a revolutionary model for 
Latin America. He believed that guerrilla groups organized in 
focos—that is, small bands in a particular area—would be able to 
sweep down from the mountains to lead revolutions throughout 
the continent, just as they had in Cuba (GUEVARA, 1978; FARBER, 
2016). The French intellectual Régis Debray turned this notion into 
a theory in his book Révolution dans la Révolution (DEBRAY, 1967). 
As Roberto Regalado writes:
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A new generation of young leftists, of diverse 
ideological identities and political affilia-
tions — social Christians, Social Democrats, 
Socialists, Communists, Trotskyists, 
Guevarists, and others — coming from the 
student, worker or peasant movement, em-
braced the form of struggle that had been 
practiced successfully by Fidel and Che 
(REGALADO, 2013, p. 76).
Inspired by the Cuban Revolution, following the prescriptions of 
Guevara and Debray, and often with Cuban support, young people 
organized guerrilla groups throughout Latin America with disas-
trous consequences almost everywhere. Guevara himself was 
killed in a failed attempt at a guerrilla revolution in Bolivia in 1967. 
Debray decided that it had all been a mistake (DEBRAY, 1974; 
CASTAñEDA, 1993). Only in Nicaragua was such a revolution 
successful and that was two decades later (LA BOTZ, 2016). The 
period that began with the Cuban Revolution and left wing guerrilla 
insurrections became between 1964 and 1985 an era of rightwing 
dictatorships in all of the Southern Cone of South America and 
much of Central America. The rightwing national security states 
kidnapped, tortured, and murdered thousands of leftists and outla-
wed their parties, virtually annihilating the Left for a generation.
A few years later, in the early 1960s, Mao Tse-tung, leader of 
the Chinese Communist Party, launched an attack on Khrushchev 
and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, arguing that they 
had become “revisionist.” While Stalin, Mao argued, had defen-
ded the dictatorship of the proletariat, Khrushchev and his “clique” 
had become pro-capitalist (TSE-TUNG, 1964). The split between 
the Soviet Union and Communist China was the most impor-
tant development in world communism in the latter half of the 
twentieth century. A couple of years later, in 1966, Mao launched 
the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, supposedly a proleta-
rian struggle against capitalist elements within China, a develop-
ment that  made China immensely popular among young radicals 
around the world and in Latin America (ROTHWELL, 2012). The 
Maoists remained popular and influential even after Mao welco-
med Richard Nixon to China in 1972 and began a tacit alliance 
with the United States. Maoists in Latin America organized in 
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labor unions, peasant leagues, and among the urban poor. Like 
the Stalinist Communism that had given birth to it, Latin American 
Maoism alternated between Popular Front politics and Third Period 
voluntarism. In Peru Abimael Guzmán’s Sendero Luminoso, foun-
ded in the 1960s, launched a violent campaign in 1980 — including 
attacks on other socialist groups — that over several years took the 
lives of 60,000 people (ROTHWELL, [s.d.]). In the 1990s the right-
wing authoritarian Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori suppressed 
Sendero Luminoso with the military and through  thousands of civi-
lian self-defense committees.
In addition to the appearance in Latin America of Cuban and 
Chinese Communism, Trotskyist groups, which had existed in 
Latin America since the 1930s, also grew in significance in the 
1970s. The Trotskyists Partido Obrero Revolucionario (POR), had 
played a key role in the Bolivian Revolution of 1952, though losing 
out in the end to the bourgeois Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario 
(MNR). Other Trotskyist groups existed in various Latin American 
nations, though their influence tended to be limited.18 During 
the 1960s and 1970s, the Trotskyist Fourth International led by 
Ernest Mandel became more significant in Europe, especially in 
France, and also took an interest in Latin America. The Fourth 
International supported the Cuban Revolution and also tended to 
be sympathetic to Che Guevara and the armed struggle groups, 
while some Latin American Trotskyists plunged headlong into 
the armed movements. As Daniel Bensaïd wrote of his youth in 
France, “Latin America was a kind of twin continent in our political 
imagination. Cuba had proclaimed itself the first liberated territory 
of the New World. Che had abandoned the exercise of power to 
devote himself to permanent revolution” (BENSAïD, 2013, p. 75). 
But when he went to Argentina in 1973 he wrote, “Our comrades 
were young and intrepid, full of confidence in the socialist future 
of humanity. Three years later, half of the people I met at these 
meetings had been arrested, tortured and murdered. It was clear 
we were on the wrong path” (BENSAïD, 2013, p. 132).
18  Alexander (1973). To get some sense of the complexities of international 
Trotskyism see De Pablo (2005).
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Though challenged by Guevarism, Maoism, and Trotskyism, 
pro-Soviet Communist parties continued to play a significant role 
in several Latino American countries. Most important was the 
Chilean Communist Party’s proactive role in the election in 1970 
of Salvador Allende to the presidency of Chile as the candidate 
of Unidad Popular, a popular front coalition of the Communist, 
Socialist, and Radical parties. Allende, who received a plurality of 36 
percent of the vote, moved swiftly to nationalize mines and facto-
ries and to carry out an agrarian reform. Finally, the Communist 
Party’s Popular Front politics appeared to be vindicated. Allende 
reestablished diplomatic relations with Cuba, and Fidel Castro visi-
ted Chile in 1971, spending nearly a month touring the country. 
Chile’s conservative elite and the military, with the support of the 
CIA, overthrew the Allende government on September 11, 1973. 
General Augusto Pinochet’s military government killed thousands, 
many of them Communists, and drove thousands of others into 
exile. Allende’s fall, which had initially seemed to vindicate the 
Communists’ Popular Front strategy, now appeared to condemn 
it. The far left drew the conclusion that if you do not overthrow 
the capitalist state, it will overthrow a leftist government (PRIETO, 
2014 [1974]). On the other hand, Communist China, which had 
welcomed Richard Nixon in 1972, quickly recognized the Pinochet 
dictatorship shortly after the 1973 coup (ROTHWELL 2012, p. 25). 
With Deng Xiao Ping’s rise to power in China and his adoption of 
pro-capitalist policies, many pro-China Communist parties aban-
doned support for China, but remained Maoists (LA BOTZ, 2012).
As Valter Pomar of the Brazilian Workers Party (PT) writes:
The Latin American Left was defeated every-
where in the 1960s and the beginning of the 
1970s: the Cuban Revolution was blockaded; 
other popular nationalist and revolutionary 
processes were defeated; Latin American 
guerrillas had no success; the Popular Unity 
experience [in Chile] ended in a tragic way; 
a great part of the continent was subjected 
to de facto or de jure dictators (REGALADO, 
2013, p. 65).
The meeting of all Latin American Communist parties in 
Havana, Cuba in 1975 represented their response to the defeat 
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of Guevara’s foquismo as well as to Pinochet’s overthrow of the 
Popular Unity government in Chile. The Communist Parties would 
reject the foco, and return to the building of mass organizations 
and to Popular Front gradualism. (MILLER, 1989, p. 54) The heyday 
of guerrilla revolution was over.
The world Communist movement took another turn in the 
1970s with the rise of Eurocommunism, which also affected Latin 
America. While the Popular Front had resembled Social Democracy, 
it was only a tactic and did not fundamentally affect the Stalinist 
core of the Communist parties around the world, which still hoped 
to create a Soviet one-party state. In 1977 the Spanish Communist 
leader Santiago Carrillo (PRESTON, 2014) published his book 
Eurocomuniso y Estado, which argued for the transformation of 
Communist Parties into genuine social democratic parties prepa-
red to govern capitalist states (CARRILLO, 1977). Historian Barry 
Carr (1985) has argued that the Mexican Communist Party took 
steps in that direction in the late 1970s, and others have suggested 
that the policy also had an impact on Chile and the future policy 
of the post-dictatorship Concertación regimes (READ; WYNDHAM, 
2015). While Eurocommunism had some impact, the Nicaraguan 
Revolution of 1979 revived the Guevarist currents, so that both 
electoralist and guerrilla perspectives continued to compete across 
the continent.
The Nicaraguan Revolution of 1979 represented the last signi-
ficant leftward political movement of the radical era of the 1960s 
and 70s. While the Sandinista Front for National Liberation (FSLN) 
had adopted the Cuban model and identified with the Soviet camp, 
it presented itself as committed to social democracy, a mixed, 
economy, and nonalignment. While the Soviet Union and Cuba 
supported the Sandinista government, so too did European social 
democratic governments. U.S. President Ronald Reagan’s govern-
ment actively backed both the civilian opposition and the Contras’ 
armed opposition to the Sandinistas. After a decade of civil war, 
the Nicaraguan people, exhausted by the revolution and civil war, 
voted the Sandinista government out of office in 1990 (LA BOTZ, 
2016).
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9 THE WASHINGTON CONSENSuS AND THE FALL OF 
COMMuNISM
The end of the twenty-year era of military dictatorships in Latin 
America began in the mid-1980s and the return to parliamentary 
democracy coincided with the rise of the Washington Consensus 
and neoliberalism. Throughout Latin America in countries previou-
sly ruled by dictatorships, new party systems, usually dominated by 
a conservative and a social democratic party were established and 
conservatives took power at first, sometimes followed by social 
democrats, though both sorts, working with the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank generally accepted structural 
adjustments and imposed neoliberal economic policies. Then in 
1991, Soviet Communism collapsed.
The Soviet Union’s control over Eastern Europe had been chal-
lenged on numerous occasions by popular upheavals: the East 
German rebellion of 1953, the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, the 
Prague Spring of 1968, and most importantly the Polish Solidaność 
national strike in 1980 (HARMAN, 1974; SINGER, 1981). While there 
were many minor rebellions within the Soviet Union itself, none 
succeeded in challenging, much less overturning, the Communist 
government. A series of internal economic and political crises 
finally led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the 
Communist government in 1991. The fall of Soviet Communism 
meant the end of its tutelage over dozens of Communist Parties 
around the world (REGALADO, 2013; 2012).
The collapse of Communism in the Soviet Union was ideologi-
cally and politically devastating to much of the old Left everywhe-
re. Official Communist Parties which had seen the Soviet Union as 
a model were demoralized and disoriented by what was for them a 
catastrophic event. Some Socialists and Trotskyists who had also 
supported the Soviet Union, however critically, were also devasta-
ted by the fall of Communism. In the wake of the fall, the former 
Communist Parties followed various trajectories, many adopting a 
social democratic programs and strategies.
By the twenty-first century, Soviet Communism’s influence in 
Latin America existed mostly as a memory. New labor and social 
movements arose and won elections in several Latin American 
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nations — most prominently Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela — in 
what was called the “pink tide.” As two leading Latin Americanists 
wrote at the time, “[…] many of the political party formations that 
currently make up the pink tide have little if any imbrication in the 
history of the left wing as it has developed over the past century” 
(WEBBER; CARR, 2013, p. 4). Propelled by popular movements of 
the indigenous, the urban poor, women, and new labor (LA BOTZ, 
2007) organizations, the new progressive governments, buoyed 
by the expanding Chinese economy and the boom in commodity 
prices, established what have been called compensatory states 
(needs source). Some saw the World Social Forum hosted by the 
Workers’ Party in Puerto Alegre in 2001 as the initiation of some-
thing like a new socialist international. But the global economic 
crisis of 2008 and the fall in commodity prices a few years later 
destroyed the economic underpinnings of the left governments — 
none of which could be called socialist — and rightwing parties 
have driven them from power in Argentina and Brazil (WEBBER, 
2017).
10 BY WAY OF A CONCLuSION
Towards the end of his history of the Communist International, 
Pierre Frank, the French Trotskyist who served in the leader-
ship of the Fourth International, asks, “What is the balance sheet 
of the Communist International?” Many, he says would say that 
it is negative. But, he suggests, that is too simplistic. He comes 
to the conclusion that it is a “precious acquisition for the futu-
re of the workers’ movement” (FRANK, 1979, p. 887). It was, he 
argues in the final chapter, a useful attempt at creating what Rosa 
Luxemburg thought a socialist international should be: “a center 
of gravity” (FRANK, 1979, p. 889 - 912). Frank was writing almost 
exclusively about the Communist International’s role in Europe 
and Asia, where the organization’s impact was greater and the 
stakes higher. Whether or not he is right about that region is a 
question that has been debated at length by many historians. In 
Latin America, however, the Communist International’s impact 
was certainly completely negative.
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 The Communist International occupied the space that a genui- 
ne  international  might  have  occupied  as  the  Communist  Parties 
competed  for  the  political  space  that  might  have  allowed  for  
the rise and flourishing of genuine revolutionary socialist parties. 
The Communist Internationals’ authoritarian and hierarchical 
subordination of all Communist Parties to the foreign policy of the 
Soviet Union  disastrously  distorted  the  Latin  American  
Communist Left. A real revolutionary socialist movement could 
only develop through democratic processes, which were 
completely alien to the Communist tradition, certainly after 1924. 
 The experience of the Russian Revolution, a genuine revolution 
from  below;  and  the  early  years  of  the  Communist  Party,  a  truly 
revolutionary  party  until  the  mid-1920s;  remain  an  inspiration  to 
small groups of revolutionaries in Latin America, mostly out of the 
Trotskyist tradition. Other revolutionaries have also developed out 
of their own experiences the understanding that international socia- 
lism must be constructed on the basis of a revolution from below, 
democratic  practices,  and  a  genuine  internationalism.  Whether 
or  not  these  small  groups  will  be  able  to  prove  more  successful 
than the Communist International remains to be seen, but at the 
moment the entire Latin American left is on the defensive.
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